Foresight 2050

Crimea 2050: foresight results

On August 5, the Crimean Platform hosted a unique event – a foresight session “Crimea 2050”, which aimed to explore the key factors shaping the future of Crimea in all its aspects: political, economic, military, socio-cultural, environmental, etc.; to work out various scenarios of events around Crimea and create a common vision of the desired future, which would be an important step in bringing Crimea and Crimeans home in every sense of the word. This work cannot be done in one day, it will require many months of efforts by expert groups – but in one day of dedicated work, it is possible to combine the efforts of different groups and different people to create a common picture of the future.

Researching the future is usually the first step towards shaping it, because those who do not have their own project of the future become only a resource for those who do. That is why almost 70 economists, sociologists, military experts, human rights activists, environmentalists, international relations specialists, civic activists, journalists, and artists decided to devote this day to working together to research the future of Crimea. How to solve the problems that have accumulated over the years? How to return Crimea not only on the map, but in reality? What should Ukraine do to make Crimea feel at home in Ukraine in 2050?

Trends shaping the future

The seven expert groups described the key trends that will determine the future of Crimea. These trends were categorized as inevitable, i.e. those that cannot be influenced by certain actors, and variable, i.e. those that can be influenced or whose nature is uncertain or subject to change. Below, unavoidable trends are marked (n) and variable trends (v). At this stage, the relative importance of the trends has not yet been assessed, so they are listed in no particular order, with the inevitable trends first, then the variable ones.

1. Economic trends:

1.1. (n) Economic Chineseization of the world.

1.2. (n) Climate change and new requirements for the agricultural sector.

1.3. (o) Economic Turkification of the Black Sea region.

1.4. (c) Pumping Russian money into certain territories, economic sectors and politicians.

1.5. (c) Development of tourism, including in new formats of bleisure, eco, craft.

1.6. (c) Remote work and de-urbanization.

1.7. (c) Development of renewable energy and desalination.

1.8. (c) Development of new logistics corridors and air hubs.

1.9. (c) Development of offshore hydrocarbon production and increased energy independence.

1.10. (c) Increase the focus of the economy on human capital.

1.11. (c) Healthy lifestyles and prolongation of the active phase of life, opportunities for European pensioners to live in Crimea.

1.12. (c) Industry 4.0: global changes in production processes and logistics.

1.13. (c) Digitalization and development of creative industries.

1.14. (c) The erosion of corporate culture in big business.

2. Political trends:

2.1. (n) Blurring of the concept of the state, changing identities.

2.2. (n) Virtualization of politics.

2.3. (o) The status of subjectivity/objectivity of Ukraine.

2.4. (c) Rise of authoritarianism, shrinking space for freedom.

2.5. (c) Realization of the principle “nothing about Ukraine and Crimea – without Ukraine and Crimea”.

2.6. (c) Crimea as an opportunity for Ukraine to gain greater subjectivity and authority in the world or Crimea as a problem.

2.7. (c) Representation of the peninsula in the media.

2.8. (c) Colonization of Crimea.

2.9. (c) Establishment/replacement of government institutions in Crimea.

2.10. (c) Opposition to the “Russian world” and Russian narratives.

2.11. (c) The existence of a clear and understandable state program for Crimea.

3. Military trends:

3.1. (n) Hybrid warfare, including information warfare; new technologies of warfare.

3.2. (m) Migration processes and related demographic changes.

3.3. (m) Population ageing and changing ethnic composition.

3.4. (m) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons.

3.5. (o) Increased competition for resources.

3.6. (o) Professionalization of warfare, reduction of human involvement, and increased role of technology.

3.7. (c) Changes in the security system and regional alliances.

3.8. (c) Loss of the state’s monopoly on war.

3.9. (c) New forms of civilian involvement in war.

4. Environmental trends:

4.1. (n) Climate change, rising sea levels, increased number of disasters, instability of water resources, increased fire hazard.

4.2. (n) Ecosystem degradation: soil erosion, abrasion.

4.3. (o) Population growth and militarization of Crimea, degradation of the natural reserve fund, household waste pollution, depletion of water and forest resources.

4.4. (c) Loss of scientific research in the field of ecology of Crimea.

4.5. (c) Loss of Crimean agriculture and fisheries and resources for recreation.

4.6. (c) Increased international attention to environmental issues.

4.7. (c) Destruction of the ecosystem of the Black and Azov Seas.

4.8. (c) The spread of alternative energy.

5. Technological trends:

5.1. (n) The spread of 5G.

5.2. (n) Cyber threats.

5.3. (n) Asymmetric warfare.

5.4. (n) Green energy.

5.5. (n) Bioengineering.

5.6. (o) Techno-authoritarianism.

5.7. (c) Rise of the creative class in big cities.

5.8. (c) Better conditions for technology industries.

6. Socio-cultural trends at the level of society:

6.1. (n) Globalization.

6.2. (n) Multiculturalism.

6.3. (n) Polarization/atomization at the community level.

6.4. (o) Spread of the “Russian world”: formation of the image of Ukraine as an enemy, closure of the information space, construction of a false reality, post-truth, militarization of the cultural space, misinterpretation of cultural heritage, etc.

6.5. (c) Popularization of Crimean Tatar culture in Ukraine, greater attention to national minorities and the rights of indigenous peoples.

6.6. (c) Changes in the level and speed of Ukraine’s involvement in global processes.

6.7. (c) The impact of North Caucasus narratives on Crimean Tatars.

6.8. (c) Despair and disorientation, blurring of identity at the individual level.

6.9. (c) Lack of independent media and non-governmental organizations in Crimea.

6.10. (c) Distrust in state institutions.

6.11. (c) Total control over religious life in Crimea.

7. Social and psychological trends at the level of the individual:

7.1. (n) Increasing control over the individual.

7.2. (n) Shrinking boundaries of privacy.

7.3. (n) Increased life expectancy.

7.4. (n) Cyborgization: new ways and interfaces of communication.

7.5. (n) Complication of self-identification, its regionalization.

7.6. (o) “Internal emigration” due to fear and low trust.

7.7. (c) External locus of control.

7.8. (c) Clip thinking.

7.9. (c) Atomization, rigidity.

7.10. (c) Militarization of consciousness.

7.11. (c) The vacuum of culture.

Thus, more than 70 important trends have been identified and described (trends partially overlap and are sometimes classified differently by different expert groups). Inevitable (unavoidable, invariant) trends form the inevitable future – what will happen in any case, unless there are unforeseen events that do not exist in our picture of the world (jokers, “black swans”). Instead, variable (changeable, flexible) trends form different scenarios of the future. All scenarios have a common part (intersection) – namely, the inevitable future.

Metaphors and jokers

In the course of the work, the foresight participants tried to find metaphors for the present and the future. The present of Crimea was described by the metaphors of “desertification”, “television reality”, “canned food”, “stolen future”, “eyes wide shut”, “air behind bars”, “military concentration camp behind a bright sign”. The metaphor of the future was formulated as follows: a pyramid of acrobats balancing on a big ball, each of them risks falling, and then everyone will fall (in this way, participants reflected the sense of fragility and interdependence of systems). The inevitable future, which is a part of all future scenarios, was described by two metaphors: a game of Tetris, where timely correct decisions allow you to build a good structure and get rid of problems, and wrong actions mean defeat; a windmill is a very complex structure that is uncontrollable and moves by the wind.

In addition to the trends that are already observed and available for study, the foresight participants tried to find jokers – unlikely and unpredictable events that would significantly change the future (this concept is also known as the “black swan”). Among the possible “joker candidates” were Ukraine’s turn to the East, the Crimean Maidan, a deep political crisis and disintegration of Russia, a climate catastrophe in the Black Sea, the fall of the Kerch Bridge, a major natural disaster such as an earthquake, a breakthrough scientific discovery in the field of desalination, successful mass civil protests in Russia or China, an acute ethnic conflict in Russia, and a sudden change in Ukraine’s policy of not recognizing the annexation of Crimea.

The most important “stretch marks,” the problem of subjectivity, and scenario space

To determine future scenarios, it was necessary to identify the most important variational trends, which was done at the next stage. The foresight participants identified the nine most important variable trends:

1. Subjectivity/objectivity of Ukraine.
2. The spread of the “Russian world”.
3. Popularization of Crimean Tatar culture, greater attention to national minorities and the rights of indigenous peoples.
4. Changes in the security system and regional alliances.
5. Crimea as an opportunity or a problem for Ukraine.
6. Colonization of Crimea.
7. Techno-authoritarianism.
8. Economic Turkification of the region.
9. Ecological degradation of the Crimea.

To form the scenario space, it is necessary to identify the most important of the most important variational trends that form alternatives (the so-called “stretch marks”). Usually, two such “stretches” are taken to form the scenario space – a matrix of 2 x 2 = 4 scenarios. It is necessary that such “stretches” are independent, because if they are interconnected by a causal relationship, the scenario space will be degenerate, i.e., it will consist of only two scenarios.

The first most important “stretch” was chosen quickly and without alternative: the subjectivity/objectivity of Ukraine, i.e., the presence of its own vision and active position in the international arena. The second-ranked variant trend, the spread of the “Russian world,” was identified in the discussion as a consequence of the lack of Ukrainian subjectivity (accordingly, the presence of Ukrainian subjectivity would mean successful opposition to Russian narratives). Similarly, Crimea is seen as an opportunity or a problem, depending on Ukraine’s subjectivity.

The next candidate for the most important variant trend was the popularization of Crimean Tatar culture and increased attention to national minorities and indigenous rights. During the discussion, the trend was formulated more broadly as the development of Crimean Tatar identity and culture in general. However, there was no critical mass of foresight participants who would consider it a second “stretch” in the formation of the scenario matrix.

The foresight participants needed a long and heated discussion to understand whose choice formed the second “stretch”. The first, aforementioned “stretch” is formed by the choice of the free people of Ukraine living on the mainland. The Russian Federation as an active geopolitical player, the West as the strongest power on the planet, the abstract “people of Crimea” (a rather dangerous construct from which the “people of Donbas” are one step away), Turkey as the strongest regional player, and the subjectless trend of global climate change, which could lead to the transformation of Crimea from a peninsula into an archipelago, were tried as subjects of the second choice. It was argued that the scenario space should be formed on the basis of the policies of the two largest players – the West and Russia; however, this approach completely loses Ukraine’s subjectivity, and the foresight methodology assumes an internal locus of control (at least one of the “stretches” should reflect the subjectivity associated with the foresight participants, and maybe both “stretches”). A rather popular suggestion during the discussion was to take two “stretch marks” corresponding to the internal locus of control and a third one corresponding to the external locus of control, namely, related to Russia’s policy (in this case, the scenario space would look like a three-dimensional matrix 2 x 2 x 2 = 8, which is a bit more complicated, but the participants were ready for this complexity).

But in the end, the discussion came to the conclusion that Russia’s policy is largely invariant, and that a change of personalities at the head of the Russian state is unlikely to have a major impact, so there is no point in choosing a stretch goal. Then two “stretch marks” should be chosen according to the internal locus of control. One is clear, but what is the other? As noted, the first “stretch mark” is formed by the choice of the people of Ukraine – meaning a multi-ethnic political nation that elects the country’s political leadership, which embodies the country’s subjective or non-subjective position in the international arena. In the end, during the discussion, the foresight participants agreed that the second “stretch” is formed by the choice of the Crimean Tatar people (here the word “people” is used in the sense of “ethnicity”) as the only subjectivized community in Crimea at the moment, although this choice can be reinforced by the personal position of other Crimean residents (in fact, everyone who wants to be civically active in Crimea will have to join the Crimean Tatar movement, because there is no other option).

Thus, the subjectivity of the Crimean Tatar people was defined as the second “stretch” of the scenario space, and the option to add a third “stretch” with the Russian choice was rejected. As a result, a matrix of scenarios was formed, which is presented in the table below, along with the typification and metaphorical names of the scenarios:

The desirable scenario was clearly defined, but opinions differed as to which scenario is inertial (i.e., what will happen if everything remains as it is now and no one does anything else), as the table shows.

Description of the scenarios

Scenario 1

Synergy (“Crimea is Ukraine’s steel eggs”)

Subjective position of Ukraine, subjective position of the Crimean Tatar people.

Main characteristics of the scenario: Ukraine restores its integrity, Crimea becomes a national Crimean Tatar autonomy of Ukraine; Ukraine joins NATO and the EU, joins the G20; Crimean Tatars from all over the world return to Crimea; Crimea becomes a center of tourism and education; Ukraine has a powerful army.

Key events (trajectory in the scenario): status of national autonomy (by 2025), establishment of representative and executive bodies in Crimea; accession to NATO by 2030, to the EU by 2040; de-occupation of Crimea by 2030.

Key players: winners: Ukrainian nation, Crimean Tatar people, Crimean Platform as an international instrument, NATO; losers: Russia; partial winners/losses: Turkey, EU.

What to do: create platforms for internal dialogue, change the narrative (get out of the victim complex), legally recognize the Mejlis, grant citizenship to the Crimean Tatar diaspora.

Indicators of this scenario: Ukraine’s movement toward the EU and NATO, a representative of the Crimean Tatar people obtaining a high elected position in Ukraine, and the creation of national autonomy in Crimea and relevant institutions.

Scenario 2

Passionate

Non-subjective position of Ukraine, subjective position of the Crimean Tatar people.

Main characteristics of the scenario: the Crimean Tatar people in all countries of their residence have a high level of self-organization and organizational resources, are recognized by the international community, build partnerships with Turkey, European countries, and the United States through the Mejlis as a representative body and economic elites of the diaspora, and demonstrate a desire for independence or autonomy above all else. Depending on the circumstances, the Crimean Tatar autonomy can be formed either within Ukraine (under the influence of active external players, in the context of Russia’s deep crisis, and without any active actions by Ukraine itself – this is a shaky, unstable and dangerous construction), or within Russia (as a national “subject of the federation” with limited opportunities for the practical realization of the rights of the people), or within Turkey (if neither Ukraine nor Russia can play the role of a subject).

Key players: depending on the state in which the Crimean Tatar national autonomy will be formed. In any case, the Crimean Tatar people will win, even in limited scenarios. The Arab world may become a possible player.

Scenario 3

Absorption (“Rapid immobility”)

Subjective position of Ukraine, non-subjective position of the Crimean Tatar people.

Main characteristics of the scenario: non-recognition or ignoring of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people, preserved, unmanifested subjectivity, political and religious repressions by Russia, transformation of the Crimean Tatar community into a closed and marginalized one.

Key events (trajectory of movement in the scenario): Ukraine’s actual abandonment of the strategy of de-occupation of Crimea; creation of a new Ukrainian narrative (historical myth) about Crimea, not related to the Crimean Tatars; strengthening of pro-Russian narratives in Crimea; declarative nature of the Ukrainian position; radicalization of religious movements and religious branches of social movements.

Key players: Russia wins, other actors lose; Turkey and Islamic religious movements may become active.

Scenario 4

Collapse (“Tradition of helplessness”)

Non-subjective position of Ukraine, non-subjective position of the Crimean Tatar people.

Main characteristics of the scenario: the next 10-20 years will be similar to what is happening now. Russia’s influence grows in all spheres; other players use Crimea as a resource for bargaining with Russia for certain economic or political preferences, as a bargaining chip to get some concessions in negotiations with Russia. The degradation of governance systems in Crimea. Subsidies to Crimea from the Russian federal government. Ecological degradation, militarization; all economic processes are linked exclusively to Russian military bases, and other economic activity is declining.

Key events (trajectory in the scenario): destruction of the principles of international law due to the unimpeded operation of European and American companies in Crimea, including investment projects. Turkey and China may make statements on Crimea that do not meet Ukraine’s vision. China is actively trying to invest in Crimea and is using the breakdown of the international law system for its own expansion into Taiwan. Great powers are more focused on other regions and forget about Crimea.

Key players: Winners: Russia, Turkey, China, the UK, the US, and NATO. Losers: all other countries in the Black Sea basin, as well as all Eastern European countries.

Indicators of this scenario: a possible significant change in Turkey’s position on Crimea, not coordinated with the Ukrainian vision.What to do: work towards creating meanings and international coalitions at the level that is accessible to civil society.The only way to prevent this scenario is to establish an effective dialogue between Ukrainian society and the Crimean Tatar people to develop a common strategy.

Key areas of action

The foresight participants proposed several dozen different initiatives to shift the development trajectory to the desired scenario. Basically, these initiatives can be classified into the following areas:

• Developing a new Ukrainian narrative about Crimea and a new Crimean Tatar narrative.
• Create platforms for public dialog.
• Significant improvement in the quality of administrative services for Crimean residents to preserve a common mental field.
• Strengthening Ukraine’s diplomatic activity.
• Increasing the combat capability of the Ukrainian army.
• Development of the Crimean Tatar language.
• Developing legislation for the transitional period of de-occupation of Crimea.
• Documentation of human rights violations in Crimea, initiation of criminal cases.
• Increase in civic activity.
• Increase the number of studies on Crimea.
• Systematization and popularization of existing cultural and educational projects.

To implement certain initiatives, the nuclei of relevant working groups were created.

Conclusions

The foresight participants identified Ukraine’s active subjective position and the clearly manifested subjectivity of the Crimean Tatar people in all countries of their residence as key factors shaping the main scenarios for the development of events in Crimea. The desired development scenario requires a change in both the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar narratives, a broad productive public dialogue, a number of complex and unclear political decisions from the political leadership of Ukraine, and an increase in civic awareness and activism.