30 May 2024

The “Trojan Horse” in the Russian-Ukrainian War

As part of our column, in cooperation with the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, we are debunking the myth of a strong Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, as well as Russian-Ukrainian agreements on the division and status of the Black Sea Fleet.

One of the problems that accompanied Russian-Ukrainian relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union was the problem of the division of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) between the states and the continued presence of Russian warships and naval forces on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula. Subsequently, it was the base of the Russian Navy in Sevastopol that became a “Trojan horse” during the occupation of Crimea in 2014 and the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian War.

The problem of dividing the fleets of the former Soviet Union among the countries that emerged from its wreckage was a typical component of Russia’s foreign policy relations with its neighbors: the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. The Russian-Ukrainian negotiations on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet were the longest and most difficult. Ukraine began creating its Armed Forces in January 1992 based on the military districts of Kyiv, Odesa, and Prykarpattia located on its territory. In the same way, the bulk of the BSF was to come under Ukraine’s control based on territorial affiliation, and Kyiv planned to swear in the personnel of the BSF forces stationed in Ukraine. Already on December 1, 1991, 72% of the personnel of the Black Sea Fleet supported the independence of Ukraine in an all-Ukrainian Referendum.

On January 3, 1992, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Ihor Kasatonov issued an order to subordinate the Black Sea Fleet to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. From January 3 to January 9, 1992, the entire Black Sea Fleet, both on the territory of Ukraine and abroad, was Ukrainian. However, on January 10, 1992, the order of the Black Sea Fleet Commander on the subordination of the BSF to Ukraine was revoked.

In early 1992, the pro-Russian command of the BSF refused to bring the personnel of the fleet to swear allegiance to Ukraine and resisted the attempts of officers to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine. The servicemen of individual units began to take the oath on their own initiative.

For example, in February, marines of the 810th Marine Brigade began to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine, but the fleet command blocked this process, and the battalion under the command of Vitalii Rozhmanov, in which 44% of the personnel took the Ukrainian oath, was disbanded.

In April 1992, the Ukrainian Navy began to form in Sevastopol, with officers who had left the Black Sea Fleet under pressure from the pro-Russian command.

In July 1992, in protest against the anti-Ukrainian activities of the Black Sea Fleet Command, the ship SKR-122 made an unauthorized transfer from Donuzlav to Odesa. Attempts by the Black Sea Fleet ships and aircraft to intercept the ship almost led to an armed conflict.

These events triggered a lengthy negotiation process at the level of the heads of state, which was accompanied by acts of aggression on the part of Russia. Not wanting to lose any control over the BSF, the Russian side tried to impede the process of the fleet’s transfer to Ukraine by using force and counterintelligence measures. In 1993-1994, the conflict culminated when Ukrainian infantry clashed with the Russian coast guard and Russia attempted to separate Crimea from Ukraine. The negotiation process culminated in the signing of three intergovernmental agreements on May 28, 1997, by the prime ministers of both countries, P. Lazarenko and V. Chernomyrdin:  

1) On the parameters of the division of the Black Sea Fleet; 

2) On the status and conditions of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s stay on the territory of Ukraine;

3) On mutual settlements related to the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine. 

The fleet is divided in the ratio determined by the previous Sochi Agreement (09.06.1995). In exchange for 31.7% of the fleet (out of a 50% share of Ukraine), Russia repays $526.509 million of Ukraine’s national debt. The agreement on the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine was to be valid for 20 years with automatic prolongation for five-year terms if the parties agreed. The amount of annual repayment of the Ukrainian state debt for the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine is $97.75 million. The parties agreed to jointly base the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy in Sevastopol. The final agreements of 1997 stipulated that the Russian Black Sea Fleet would be based in several locations in Crimea (Sevastopol, Hvardiyske, Feodosiia, etc.). Parts of the Black Sea Fleet in mainland Ukraine (Odesa, Izmail, Mykolaiv, Ochakiv) were transferred to the Ukrainian Navy in 1994-1995.

Following the agreements, the number of servicemen in the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation was not to exceed 25,000. Until 2013, the fleet was undergoing a systematic reduction through retirement, abolition, and replacement of certain positions with civilian personnel. As of 2014, about 12.5 thousand people served in the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. 

The same treaties also determined the types and quantities of weapons that could be kept on Ukrainian territory. This made it impossible for the Russians to modernize their weapons, but there was another problem that violated Ukrainian sovereignty in Sevastopol. Representatives of Ukraine were not allowed to visit important naval facilities to determine the state of compliance with the agreements by the Russian side. For the ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet permanently stationed in Sevastopol, the regime of crossing the state border of Ukraine was notified, not allowed. Russian ships were not subject to control by the border and customs services of Ukraine. This created opportunities for illegal import of various goods. Another problem was the sublease of a number of land areas to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, as well as the lack of a defined procedure for the use of the Black Sea Fleet in crisis situations. 

The agreements signed in 1997 provided for a basic period of the Black Sea Fleet’s presence until 2017. The redeployment of these forces was to be carried out by the Russian side within a few years, but Moscow did not prepare for the withdrawal of the fleet and demonstrated confidence that the BSF would remain in Crimea. With the signing of the so-called “Kharkiv Agreements” on April 21, 2010, the stay of the Black Sea Fleet was extended for 25 years (until 2042) in exchange for a gas discount for Ukraine. The signing of the agreement did not solve all the problems of the Russian ships’ stay in Sevastopol, it only postponed the deadline for the fleet’s stay. 

With the beginning of the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation announced the termination of all interstate agreements from 1997-2010 on the fleet. At the same time, the Ukrainian side insists that they remain in force, which is an argument against Russia in international courts.

Throughout its stay on the peninsula, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has provided active organizational and moral support to pro-Russian forces on the peninsula, becoming the main institution of Russian interests. Many of the pro-Russian activists were retired from the fleet. Officers provided classified information (including intelligence information) to activists of pro-Russian groups. In return, pro-Russian organizations lobbied for the lifting of restrictions on the duration and development of the military potential of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. In February 2014, after the start of the large-scale invasion, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was used to occupy the Crimean Peninsula and attack other regions of Ukraine, becoming a real “Trojan horse” in the process.

Today, Russia is using its Armed Forces in the Black Sea not only for a full-scale invasion in the form of transporting troops, cargo, equipment, and strikes. Among the targets is the cargo shipping sector as an element of economic pressure on Ukraine through the use of naval blockade tools, as well as port infrastructure. Russia has attacked civilian cargo ships, obstructing freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, even though this threatens global food security. However, Ukraine managed to stabilize the situation in the Black Sea by systematically targeting Russian warships, resulting in Russia’s loss of a third of its Black Sea Fleet, which is mostly located in the temporarily occupied Crimea. 

According to the Naval Forces of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, as of April 2024, Ukraine has managed to destroy about 27 Russian ships and damage more than 15 out of a total of about 80 units. On the night of May 19, Defense Forces of Ukraine hit a small missile ship, the Cyclone. After the loss of several key ships, Russia was forced to transfer part of the fleet from Crimean ports to its territory, demonstrating the weakness of the Black Sea Fleet. Destruction of the fleet and a ban on its possession is what awaits Russia for its stolen ships, aggressive policies, and war.

(Based on the book Crimea Behind the Curtain. A Guide to the Occupied Zone by Olha Volianiuk, Khrystyna Dobrovolska, and Maksym Maiorov, and the publication by Yevhen Lupakov The First Oath to the Ukrainian People)